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The dissemination of Electronic Health Records (EHRs) can be highly beneﬁcial for a range of medical
studies, spanning from clinical trials to epidemic control studies, but it must be performed in a way that
preserves patients’ privacy. This is not straightforward, because the disseminated data need to be
protected against several privacy threats, while remaining useful for subsequent analysis tasks. In this
work, we present a survey of algorithms that have been proposed for publishing structured patient data,
in a privacy-preserving way. We review more than 45 algorithms, derive insights on their operation, and
highlight their advantages and disadvantages. We also provide a discussion of some promising directions
for future research in this area.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Electronic Medical Record/ Electronic Health Record (EMR/EHR)
systems are increasingly adopted to collect and store various types
of patient data, which contain information about patients’ demo-
graphics, diagnosis codes, medication, allergies, and laboratory test
results [22,90,63]. For instance, the use of EMR/EHR systems,
among ofﬁce-based physicians, increased from 18% in 2001 to
72% in 2012 and is estimated to exceed 90% by the end of the dec-
ade [56].
Data from EMR/EHR systems are increasingly disseminated, for
purposes beyond primary care, and this has been shown to be a
promising avenue for improving research [63]. This is because it
allows data recipients to perform large-scale, low-cost analytic
tasks, which require applying statistical tests (e.g., to study corre-
lations between BMI and diabetes), data mining tasks, such as clas-
siﬁcation (e.g., to predict domestic violence [107]) and clustering
(e.g., to control epidemics [117]), or query answering. To facilitate
the dissemination and reuse of patient-speciﬁc data and help the
advancement of research, a number of repositories have been
established, such as the Database of Genotype and Phenotype
(dbGaP) [89], in the U.S., and the U.K. Biobank [104], in the United
Kingdom.1.1. Motivation
While the dissemination of patient data is greatly beneﬁcial, it
must be performed in a way that preserves patients’ privacy. Many
approaches have been proposed to achieve this, by employing var-
ious techniques [43,5], such as cryptography (e.g., [73,55,121,11])
and access control (e.g., [110,71]). However, these approaches are
not able to offer patient anonymity (i.e., that patients’ private
and conﬁdential information will not be disclosed) when data
about patients are disseminated [39]. This is because the data need
to be disseminated to a wide (and potentially unknown) set of
recipients.
Towards preserving anonymity, policies that restrict the sharing
of patient-speciﬁc medical data are emerging worldwide [91]. For
example, in the U.S., the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [120] outlines two
policies for protecting anonymity, namely Safe Harbor, and Expert
Determination. The ﬁrst of these policies enumerates eighteen direct
identiﬁers that must be removed from data, prior to their dissemi-
nation, while, according to the Expert Determination policy, an
expert needs to certify that the data to be disseminated pose a
low privacy risk before the data can be sharedwith external parties.
Similar policies are in place in countries, such as the U.K. [2] and
Canada [3], as well as in the European Union [1]. These policies
focus on preventing the privacy threat of identity disclosure (also
referred to as re-identiﬁcation), which involves the association of
an identiﬁed individual with their record in the disseminated data.
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putational guarantees for thwarting identity disclosure nor aim at pre-
serving the usefulness of disseminated data in analytic tasks.
To address re-identiﬁcation, as well as other privacy threats, the
computer science and health informatics communities have devel-
oped various techniques. Most of these techniques aim at publish-
ing a dataset of patient records, while satisfying certain privacy
and data usefulness objectives. Typically, privacy objectives are
formulated using privacy models, and enforced by algorithms that
transform a given dataset (to facilitate privacy protection) to the
minimum necessary extent. The majority of the proposed algo-
rithms are applicable to data containing demographics or diagnosis
codes,1 focus on preventing the threats of identity, attribute, and/or
membership disclosure (to be deﬁned in subsequent sections), and
operate by transforming the data using generalization and/or
suppression techniques.
1.2. Contributions
In this work, we present a survey of algorithms for publishing
patient-speciﬁc data in a privacy-preserving way. We begin by dis-
cussing the main privacy threats that publishing such data entails,
and present the privacy models that have been designed to prevent
these threats. Subsequently, for each privacy threat, we provide a
survey of algorithms that have been proposed to block it. When
selecting the privacy algorithms to be surveyed in the article, we
put preference on methods that have appeared in major confer-
ences and journals in the area, as well as are effective in terms of
preserving privacy and maintaining good utility. We opted for dis-
cussing algorithms that signiﬁcantly differ from one another, by
excluding articles that propose minor algorithmic variations. For
the surveyed privacy algorithms we explain the strategies that
they employ for: (i) transforming data, (ii) preserving data useful-
ness, and (iii) searching the space of potential solutions. Based on
these strategies, we classify over 45 privacy algorithms. This allows
deriving interesting insights on the operation of these algorithms,
as well as on their advantages and limitations. In addition, we pro-
vide an overview of techniques for preserving privacy that are
designed for different settings and types of data, and identify a
number of important research directions for future work.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst survey on algo-
rithms for facilitating the privacy-preserving sharing of structured
medical data. However, there are surveys in the computer science
literature that do not focus on methods applicable to such data
[39], as well as surveys that focus on privacy preservation methods
for text data [94], privacy policies [91,93], or system security [36]
issues. In addition, we would like to note that the aim of this paper
is to provide insights on the tasks and objectives of a wide range of
algorithms. Thus, we have omitted the technical details and analy-
sis of speciﬁc algorithms and refer the reader to the publications
describing the algorithms for them.
1.2.1. Organization
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the privacy threats and models that have been proposed
for preventing them. Section 3 discusses the two scenarios for pri-
vacy-preserving data sharing. Section 4 surveys algorithms for
publishing data, in the non-interactive scenario. Section 5
discusses other classes of related techniques. Section 6 presents
possible directions for future research, and Section 7 concludes
the paper.1 These algorithms deal with either relational or transaction (set-valued) attributes.
However, following [34,75,76,87], we discuss them in the context of demographic and
diagnosis information, which is modeled using relational and transaction attributes,
respectively.2. Privacy threats and models
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss the major privacy threats that
are related to the disclosure of individuals’ private and/or sensitive
information. Then, we present privacy models that can be used to
guard against each of these threats. The importance of discussing
privacy models is twofold. First, privacy models can be used to
evaluate how safe data are prior to their release. Second, privacy
models can be incorporated into algorithms to ensure that the data
can be transformed in a way that preserves privacy.2.1. Privacy threats
Privacy threats relate to three different types of attributes, direct
identiﬁers, quasi-identiﬁers, and sensitive attributes. Direct identiﬁ-
ers are attributes that can explicitly re-identify individuals, such
as name, mailing address, phone number, social security number,
other national IDs, and email address. On the other hand, quasi-
identiﬁers are attributes which in combination can lead to identity
disclosure, such as demographics (e.g., gender, date of birth, and
zip code) [109,128] and diagnosis codes [75]. Last, sensitive attri-
butes are those that patients are not willing to be associated with.
Examples of these attributes are speciﬁc diagnosis codes (e.g., psy-
chiatric diseases, HIV, cancer, etc.) and genomic information. In
Table Table 1, we present an example dataset, in which Name
and Phone Number are direct identiﬁers, Date of birth, Zip
Code, and Gender are quasi-identiﬁers, and DNA is a sensitive
attribute.
Based on the above-mentioned types of attributes, we can
consider the following classes of privacy threats:
 Identity disclosure (or re-identiﬁcation) [112,128]: This is argu-
ably the most notorious threat in publishing medical data. It
occurs when an attacker can associate a patient with their
record in a published dataset. For example, an attacker may
re-identify Maria in Table 1, even if the table is published
deprived of the direct identiﬁers (i.e., Name and Phone Number).
This is because Maria is the only person in the table who was
born on 17.01.1982 and also lives in zip code 55332.
 Membership disclosure [100]: This threat occurs when an
attacker can infer with high probability that an individual’s
record is contained in the published data. For example, consider
a dataset which contains information on only HIV-positive
patients. The fact that a patient’s record is contained in the
dataset allows inferring that the patient is HIV-positive, and
thus poses a threat to privacy. Note that membership disclosure
may occur even when the data are protected from identity dis-
closure, and that there are several real-world scenarios where
protection against membership disclosure is required. Such
interesting scenarios were discussed in detail in [100,101].
 Attribute disclosure (or sensitive information disclosure) [88]: This
threat occurs when an individual is associated with information
about their sensitive attributes. This information can be, for
example, the individual’s value for the sensitive attribute (e.g.,
the value in DNA in Table 1), or a range of values which contain
an individual’s sensitive value (e.g., if the sensitive attribute is
Hospitalization Cost, then knowledge that a patient’s value in
this attribute lies in a narrow range, say ½5400;5500, may be
considered as sensitive, as it provides a near accurate estimate
of the actual cost incurred, which may be considered to be high,
rare, etc.).
There have been several incidents of patient data publishing,
where identity disclosure has transpired. For instance, Sweeney
[112] ﬁrst demonstrated the problem in 2002, by linking a claims
Table 1
An example of different types of attributes in a relational table.
Direct identiﬁers Quasi-identiﬁers Sensitive attribute
Name Phone number Date of birth Zip code Gender DNA
Tom Green 6152541261 11.02.1980 55432 Male AT. . .G
Johanna Marer 6152532126 17.01.1982 55454 Female CG. . .A
Maria Durhame 6151531562 17.01.1982 55332 Female TG. . .C
Helen Tulid 6153553230 10.07.1977 55454 Female AA. . .G
Tim Lee 6155837612 15.04.1984 55332 Male GC. . .T
Table 2
Privacy models to guard against different attacks.
Attack type Privacy models
Demographics Diagnosis codes
Identity disclosure k-Anonymity [112]
k-Map [34] Complete k-anonymity [52]
ð1; kÞ-Anonymity [45] km-Anonymity [115]
ðk;1Þ-Anonymity [45] Privacy-constrained
anonymity [76]
ðk; kÞ-Anonymity [45]
Membership
disclosure
d-Presence [100]
c-conﬁdent d-presence
[103]
Attribute
disclosure
l-Diversity [88,69]
(a; k)-Anonymity [126]
p-Sensitive-k-anonymity
[118]
q-Uncertainty [16]
t-Closeness [69] ðh; k; pÞ-Coherence [130]
Range-based [81,60] PS-rule based anonymity [80]
Variance-based [64]
Worst Group Protection
[84]
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was disseminated by the Group Insurance Commission, to the
voter list of Cambridge, Massachusetts. The linkage was performed,
based on patient demographics (e.g., Date of birth, Zip code, and
Gender) and led to the re-identiﬁcation of, WilliamWeld, then gov-
ernor of Massachusetts. It was also suggested that more than 87%
of U.S. citizens could be re-identiﬁed, based on such attacks. Many
other identity disclosure incidents have been reported since [33].
These include attacks in which (i) students re-identiﬁed individu-
als in the Chicago homicide database by linking it with the social
security death index, (ii) an expert witness re-identiﬁed most of
the individuals represented in a neuroblastoma registry, and (iii)
a national broadcaster re-identiﬁed a patient, who died while tak-
ing a drug, by combining the adverse drug event database with
public obituaries.
Membership and attribute disclosure have not led yet to docu-
mented privacy breaches in the healthcare domain. However, they
have raised serious privacy concerns and were shown to be feasible
in various domains. For example, individuals who were opposed to
their potential association with sensitive movies (e.g., movies
related to their sexual orientation) took legal action when it was
shown that data published by Netﬂix may be susceptible to
attribute disclosure attacks [99].2.2. Privacy models
In this section, we present some well-established privacy mod-
els that guard against the aforementioned threats. These privacy
models: (i) model what leads to one or more privacy threats and
(ii) describe a computational strategy to enforce protection against
the threat. Privacy models are subsequently categorized according
to the privacy threats they protect from, as also presented in
Table 2.2.2.1. Models against identity disclosure
A plethora of privacy models have been proposed to prevent
identity disclosure in medical data publishing. These models can
be grouped, based on they type of data to which they are applied,
into two major categories: (i) models for demographics and (ii)
models for diagnosis codes.2.2.1.1. Models for demographics. The most popular privacy model
for protecting demographics is k-anonymity [109,112]. k-anonym-
ity requires each record in a dataset D to contain the same values in
the set of Quasi-IDentiﬁer attributes (QIDs) with at least k  1
other tuples in D. Recall that quasi-identiﬁers are typically innocu-
ous attributes that can be used in combination to link external data
sources with the published dataset. Satisfying k-anonymity offers
protection against identity disclosure, because it limits the proba-
bility of linking an individual to their record, based on QIDs, to 1=k.
The parameter k controls the level of offered privacy and is set by
data publishers, usually to 5 in the context of patient demograph-
ics [92].Another privacy model that has been proposed for demograph-
ics is k-map [113]. This model is similar to k-anonymity but con-
siders that the linking is performed based on larger datasets
(called population tables), from which the published dataset has
been derived. Thus, k-map is less restrictive than k-anonymity,
typically allowing the publishing of more detailed patient informa-
tion, which helps data utility preservation. On the negative side,
however, the k-map privacy model is weaker (in terms of offered
privacy protection) than k-anonymity because it assumes that: (i)
attackers do not know whether a record is included in the pub-
lished dataset and (ii) data publishers have access to the popula-
tion table.
El Emam et al. [34] provide a discussion of the k-anonymity and
k-map models and propose risk-based measures, which approxi-
mate k-map and are more applicable in certain re-identiﬁcation
scenarios. Three privacy models, called ð1; kÞ-anonymity, ðk;1Þ-ano-
nymity and ðk; kÞ-anonymity, which follow a similar concept to k-
map, and are relaxations to k-anonymity, have been proposed by
Gionis et al. [45]. These models differ in their assumptions about
the capabilities of attackers and can offer higher data utility but
weaker privacy than k-anonymity.2.2.1.2. Models for diagnosis codes. Several privacy models have
been proposed to protect identity disclosure attacks when sharing
diagnosis codes. The work of He and Naughton [52] proposed com-
plete k-anonymity, a model which assumes that any combination of
diagnosis codes can lead to identity disclosure and requires at least
k records, in the published dataset, to have the same diagnosis
codes. Complete k-anonymity, however, may harm data utility
unnecessarily because it is extremely difﬁcult for attackers to
know all the diagnoses in a patient record [75].
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posed by Terrovitis et al. in [115]. km-anonymity uses a parameter
m to control the maximum number of diagnosis codes that may be
known to an attacker, and it requires each combination of m diag-
nosis codes to appear in at least k records of the released dataset.
This privacy model is useful in scenarios in which data publishers
are unable (or unwilling) to specify certain sets of diagnosis codes
that may lead to identity disclosure attacks.
Recently, a privacy model, called privacy-constrained anonymity,
was introduced by Loukides et al. in [76]. Privacy-constrained ano-
nymity is based on the notion of privacy constraints. These are sets
of diagnosis codes that may be known to an attacker and, collec-
tively, they form the privacy policy. Given an owner-speciﬁed
privacy policy, the privacy-constrained anonymity model limits
the probability of performing identity disclosure to at most 1=k,
by requiring the set of diagnoses in each privacy constraint to
appear at least k times in the dataset (or not appear at all).
By deﬁnition, privacy-constrained anonymity assumes that
attackers know whether a patient’s record is contained in the
released dataset. This assumption is made by most research in
the ﬁeld (e.g., [115,130,52,78]), because such knowledge can be
obtained by applying the procedure used to create the released
data from a larger patient population, which is often described in
the literature [75]. Relaxing this assumption, however, is straight-
forward by following an approach similar to that of the k-map
model, and can potentially offer more utility at the expense of pri-
vacy. Privacy-constrained anonymity allows protecting only sets of
diagnosis codes that may be used in identity disclosure attacks, as
speciﬁed by the privacy policy. Thus, it addresses a signiﬁcant
limitation of both complete k-anonymity and km-anonymity which
tend to overly protect the data (i.e., by protecting all or all m
combinations of diagnosis codes), as well as preserving data utility
signiﬁcantly better.
2.2.2. Models against membership disclosure
The privacy models that have been discussed so far are not ade-
quate for preventing membership disclosure, as explained in [100].
To address this shortcoming, two privacy models have been pro-
posed by Nergiz et al. in [100,101]. The ﬁrst of these models, called
d-presence [100], aims at limiting the attacker’s ability to infer that
an individual’s record is contained in a relational dataset D, given a
version eD of dataset D that is to be published and a public, popu-
lation table P. The latter table is assumed to contain ‘‘all publicly
known data’’ (i.e., the direct identiﬁers and quasi-identiﬁers of all
individuals in the population, including those in D). Satisfying d-
presence offers protection against membership disclosure, because
the probability of inferring that an individual’s record is contained
in table D, using eD and P, will be within a range ðdmin; dmaxÞ of
acceptable probabilities. A record that is inferred with a probability
within this range is called d-present, and the parameters dmin and
dmax are set by data publishers, who also need to possess the pop-
ulation table P.
The fact that d-presence requires data owners to have access to
complete information about the population, in the form of table P,
limits its applicability. To address this issue, Nergiz et al. [103] pro-
posed the c-conﬁdent d-presence privacy model. This model
assumes a set of distribution functions for the population (i.e.,
attackers know the probability that an individual is associated with
one or more values, over one or more attributes) instead of table P,
and ensures that a record is d-present with respect to the popula-
tion with an owner-speciﬁed probability c.
2.2.3. Models against attribute disclosure
Privacy models against sensitive attribute disclosure can be
classiﬁed into two groups, according to the type of attributes they
are applied to: (i) models for patient demographics and (ii) modelsfor diagnosis codes. In what follows, we describe some representa-
tive privacy models from each group.
2.2.3.1. Models for demographics. The most popular privacy model
that thwarts attribute disclosure attacks in patient demographics
is l-diversity [88]. It requires each anonymized group in a dataset
D to contain at least l ‘‘well represented’’ sensitive attribute (SA) val-
ues [88]. In most cases, an anonymized group is k-anonymous (i.e.,
it contains at least k records with the same values over the set of
quasi-identiﬁers), although this is not a requirement of the deﬁni-
tion of l-diversity. The simplest interpretation of ‘‘well repre-
sented’’ is distinct and leads to distinct l-diversity [69], which
requires each anonymized group to contain at least l distinct SA
values. Another interpretation leads to recursive (c; l)-diversity
[88], which requires each group in D to contain a large number
of distinct SA values, none of which appears ‘‘too’’ often. Other
principles that guard against value disclosure by limiting the
number of distinct SA values in an anonymized group are (a; k)-
anonymity [126] and p-sensitive-k-anonymity [118]. However, these
privacy principles still allow attackers to infer that an individual is
likely to have a certain SA value when that value appears much
more frequently than other values in the group.
t-closeness [69] is another privacy model for protecting demo-
graphics from attribute disclosure attacks. This model aims at lim-
iting the distance between the probability distribution of the SA
values in an anonymized group and that of SA values in the entire
dataset. This prevents an attacker from learning information about
an individual’s SA value that is not available from the dataset. Con-
sider, for example, a dataset in which 60% of tuples have the value
Flu in a SA Disease, and we form an anonymous group, which
also has 60% of its disease values as Flu. Then, although an
attacker can infer that an individual in the group suffers from
Flu with relatively high probability (i.e. 60%), the group is
protected according to t-closeness, since this fact can be inferred
from the dataset itself.
Privacy models to guard against the disclosure of sensitive
ranges of values in numerical attributes have also been proposed.
Models that work by limiting the maximum range of SA values
in a group of tuples have been proposed by Loukides et al. [81]
and Koudas et al. [60], while LeFevre et al. [64] proposed limiting
the variance of SA values instead. A privacy model, called Worst
Group Protection (WGP), which prevents range disclosure and can
be enforced without generalization of SA values was introduced
in [84]. WGP measures the probability of disclosing any range in
the least protected group of a table, and captures the way SA values
form ranges in a group, based on their frequency and similarity.
2.2.3.2. Models for diagnosis codes. Several privacy models have
been proposed to protect attribute disclosure attacks when sharing
diagnosis codes (e.g., the association of patients with sensitive
diagnosis codes, such as those representing sexually transmitted
diseases). One such model, proposed by Cao et al. [16], is
q-uncertainty, which limits the probability of associating an
individual with any (single) diagnosis code to less than q. This
model makes the (stringent) assumption that each diagnosis code
in a patient record can be sensitive, and all the remaining codes in
the record may be used for its inference.
Another privacy model, called ðh; k; pÞ-coherence, was proposed
in [130] and guards against both identity and sensitive information
disclosure. This model treats non-sensitive diagnosis codes
similarly to km-anonymity and limits the probability of inferring
sensitive diagnosis codes. In fact, parameters k and p have a similar
role to k and m in km-anonymity, and h limits the probability of
attribute disclosure.
The PS-rule based anonymity model (PS-rule stands for Privacy
Sensitive rule), proposed by Loukides et al. in [80], also thwarts both
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tion rules [7], PS-rules consist of two sets of diagnosis codes, the
antecedent and consequent, which contain diagnosis codes that
may be used in identity and sensitive information disclosure
attacks, respectively. Given a PS-rule A ! B, where A and B is the
antecedent and consequent of the rule, respectively, PS-rule based
anonymity requires that the set of diagnosis codes in A appears in
at least k records of the published dataset, while at most c  100% of
the records that contain the diagnosis codes in A, also contain the
diagnosis codes in B. Thus, it protects against attackers who know
whether a patient’s record is contained in the published dataset.
The parameter c is speciﬁed by data publishers, takes values
between 0 and 1, and is analogous to the conﬁdence threshold in
association rule mining [7]. The PS-rule based anonymity model
offers three signiﬁcant beneﬁts compared to previously discussed
models for diagnosis codes: (i) it protects against both identity
and sensitive information disclosure, (ii) it allows data publishers
to specify detailed privacy requirements and (iii) it is more general
than these models (i.e., the models in [115,130,52] are special
cases of PS-rule based anonymity).3. Privacy scenarios
There are two scenarios for privacy-preserving data sharing, as
illustrated in Fig. 1. In this paper, we survey privacy models and
algorithms that belong to the non-interactive data sharing sce-
nario. This scenario has certain beneﬁts: (i) it offers constant data
availability (since the original dataset is published after being
anonymized), (ii) it does not require any infrastructure costs, and
(iii) it is good for hypothesis generation and testing (since patient
records are published in a utility-aware, anonymized form). How-
ever, the non-interactive scenario suffers from two important
shortcomings. First, data owners need to specify privacy and utility
requirements prior to sharing their data, in order to ensure that the
released dataset is adequately protected and highly useful. Second,
data owners have no control over the released dataset. Thus, the
released dataset may be susceptible to attacks that had not been
discovered at the time of data release.
Privacy-preserving data sharing can also be facilitated in the
non-interactive scenario. This scenario assumes that the data are
deposited into a (secure) repository and can be queried by external
data users. Thus, the users receive protected answers to their que-
ries, and not the entire dataset, as in the non-interactive scenario.
The interactive scenario offers three main beneﬁts, which stem
from the fact that data are kept in-house to the hosting
organization.
First, data owners can audit the use of their data and apply
access control policies. This ensures that attackers can be identiﬁed
and held accountable, a capability that is not offered by techniques
that are designed for the non-interactive scenario. Furthermore,
the enforced protection mechanism for the repository can be
improved at any time based on new privacy threats that are iden-
tiﬁed, thus data owners can provide state-of-the-art protection of
the sensitive data in the repository. Second, the interactive sce-
nario allows the enforcement of strong, semantic privacy models
that will be discussed later. Third, the fact that the types of posed
queries are known a priori to data owners helps deciding on an
appropriate level of privacy that should be offered when answering
the queries.
On the other hand, complex queries are difﬁcult to support in
the interactive setting, while there are often restrictions on the
number of queries that can be answered. Additionally, several ana-
lytic tasks (e.g., visualization) require individual records, as
opposed to aggregate results or models. These tasks are difﬁcult
to be supported in the interactive scenario. In general, it isinteresting to observe that the advantages of the interactive
scenario are disadvantages of the non-interactive scenario, and
vice versa. Consequently, data publishers need to carefully select
the appropriate privacy-preserving data sharing scenario based
on their needs.
A popular class of algorithms that are designed for the interac-
tive scenario enforce privacy by adding noise to each query answer,
thereby offering output privacy. The goal of these algorithms is to
tune the magnitude of the added noise so that privacy is preserved,
while accurate, high-level statistics can still be computed using
queries. For instance, several algorithms that enforce differential
privacy [29], a strong privacy model to be discussed later, in the
interactive setting, are surveyed in [30]. In addition to constructing
protected query answers, these algorithms monitor the number of
queries posed to the system and stop answering queries, when the
maximum number of queries that can be answered, while satisfy-
ing differential privacy, is reached. The release of statistics in a
privacy-preserving way has also been thoroughly investigated by
the statistical disclosure control community (see [4] for a survey).
However, the techniques in [4] do not guarantee privacy preserva-
tion using a rigorous privacy model [29].4. Privacy techniques
In this section, we provide a classiﬁcation of algorithms that
employ the privacy models in Section 2 and have been designed
for the non-interactive scenario. These algorithms are summarized
in Table 3. For each class of algorithms, we also discuss techniques
that are employed in their operation.
4.1. Algorithms against identity disclosure
The prevention of identity disclosure requires transforming
quasi-identiﬁers to enforce a privacy model in a way that preserves
data utility. Since transforming the data to achieve privacy and
optimal utility is computationally infeasible (see for example
[109]), most algorithms adopt heuristic strategies to explore the
space of possible solutions. That is, they consider different ways
of transforming quasi-identiﬁers in order to ﬁnd a ‘‘good’’ solution
that satisﬁes privacy and the utility objective. After discussing
approaches to transform quasi-identiﬁers, we survey utility
objectives and heuristic strategies. Based on this, we subsequently
present a detailed classiﬁcation of algorithms.
4.1.1. Transforming quasi-identiﬁers
There are three main techniques to transform quasi-identiﬁers
in order to prevent identity disclosure: (i) microaggregation [24],
(ii) generalization [109], and (iii) suppression [109]. Microaggrega-
tion involves replacing a group of values in a QID using a summary
statistic (e.g., centroid or median for numerical and categorical
QIDs, respectively). This technique has been applied to demo-
graphics but not to diagnosis codes. Generalization, on the other
hand, suggests replacing QID values by more general, but semanti-
cally consistent, values. Two generalization models, called global
and local recoding, have been proposed in the literature (see
[102] for an excellent survey of generalization models). Global
recoding involves mapping the domain of QIDs into generalized
values. These values correspond to aggregate concepts (e.g., British
instead of English, for Ethnicity) or collections of values (e.g., Eng-
lish or Welsh, for Ethnicity, or 18–30, for Age). Thus, all occurrences
of a certain value (e.g., English) in a dataset will be generalized to
the same value (e.g., European). On the other hand, local recoding
involves mapping QID values of individual records into generalized
ones on a group-by-group basis. Therefore, the value English in two
different records may be replaced by British in one record, and by
Privacy aware query answering
Data request 
Privacy-aware result 
Protected data 
repository
Researchers
data owners           data publisher (trusted)      data recipient (untrusted)
Original
data
Released
data
PROS:
- Data is kept in-house
- Strong privacy
- Attack identi cation and recovery 
    from breaches are possible
CONS:
- Dif cult to answer complex queries
- Data availability reduces with time
- Infrastructure costs
- Bad for hypothesis generation(a) The interactive scenario (akin to statistical databases) 
PROS:
- Constant data availability
- No infrastructure costs
- Good for hypothesis generation and testing
CONS:
- Privacy and utility requirements need to be speci ed
- Publisher has no control after data publishing
- No auditing can be performed
(b) The non-interactive scenario (also known as data publishing ) 
Fig. 1. Privacy-preserving data sharing scenarios: (a) interactive vs. (b) non-interactive.
Table 3
Algorithms to prevent against different attacks.
Attack type Privacy models
Demographics Diagnosis codes
Identity
disclosure
k-Minimal generalization [109]
OLA [32]
Incognito [65]
Genetic [58]
Mondrian [66,67] UGACLIP [76]
TDS [40] CBA [87]
NNG [28] UAR [86]
Greedy [129] Apriori [115]
k-Member [15] LRA [116]
KACA [68] VPA [116]
Agglomerative [45] mHgHs [74]
ðk; kÞ-Anonymizer [45] Recursive partition [52]
Hilb [44]
iDist [44]
MDAV [25]
CBFS [62]
Membership
disclosure
SPALM [100]
MPALM [100]
SFALM [101]
Attribute
disclosure
Incognito with l-diversity [88]
Incognito with t-closeness [69]
Incognito with ða; kÞ-anonymity
[126]
Greedy [130]
p-Sensitive k-anonymity [118] SuppressControl [16]
Mondrian with l-diversity [127] TDControl [16]
Mondrian with t-closeness [70] RBAT [79]
Top down [126] Tree-based [80]
Greedy algorithm [81] Sample-based [80]
Hilb with l-diversity [44]
iDist with l-diversity [44]
Anatomize [127]
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either by aggregate concepts (e.g., Diseases of Other Endocrine
Glands instead of Diabetes melitus type I) or by sets of diagnosiscodes (e.g., {Diabetes melitus type I, Diabetes melitus type II}), which
are interpreted as any (non-empty) subset of diagnosis codes
contained in the set. Last, suppression involves the deletion of
speciﬁc QID values from the data.
Although each technique has its beneﬁts, generalization is typ-
ically preferred over microaggregation and suppression. This is
because microaggregation may harm data truthfulness (i.e., the
centroid may not appear in the data), while suppression incurs
high information loss. Interestingly, there are techniques that
employ more than one of these operations. For example, the work
of [76] employs suppression when it is not possible to apply
generalization while satisfying some utility requirements.
4.1.2. Utility objectives
Preventing identity disclosure may lower the utility of data, as it
involves data transformation. Thus, existing methods aim at pre-
serving data utility by following one of the following general strat-
egies: (i) they quantify information loss using an optimization
measure, which they attempt to minimize, (ii) they assume that
data will be used in a speciﬁc data analysis task and attempt to
preserve the accuracy of performing this task using the published
data, and (iii) they take into account utility requirements, speciﬁed
by data owners, and aim at generating data that satisfy these
requirements. In what follows, we discuss each of these strategies.
One way to capture data utility is by measuring the level of
information loss incurred by data transformation. The measures
that have been proposed are based on (i) the size of anonymization
groups or (ii) the characteristics of generalized values. Measures of
the ﬁrst category are based on the intuition that all records in an
anonymization group are indistinguishable from one another, as
they have the same value over QIDs. Thus, larger groups incur more
information loss. Examples of these measures are Discernability
Metric (DM) [9] and Normalized Average Equivalence Class Size
[66], which differ from one another in the way they penalize
groups. The main drawback of these measures is that they neglect
the way values are transformed within an anonymized group.
These measures, for example, would assign the same penalty to a
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eralized to 14–16 or Underage. However, using the generalized
value 14–16 incurs lower information loss, as this is more speciﬁc
than Underage.
The above-mentioned limitation is addressed by the second
category of measures, which take into account the way values
are generalized. Examples of these measures are Generalization Cost
(GC) [6], Normalized Certainty Penalty (NCP) [129], and Loss Metric
(LM) [58]. All of these measures are applicable to demographics
and penalize less speciﬁc generalized values (i.e., they favor British
over European) but the latter two (i.e., NCP and LM) are more
ﬂexible, as they can be applied to both numerical and categorical
attributes. A recently proposed information-loss measure for diag-
nosis codes is Information Loss Metric (ILM) [87]. ILM quantiﬁes
information loss of a generalized diagnosis code by imposing a
large penalty on generalized terms that contain many diagnosis
codes and appear in many records of the dataset.
Another way to capture data utility is based on measuring the
accuracy of a speciﬁc task performed on anonymized data. Iyengar
[58], for example, observed that generalization can make it difﬁcult
to build an accurate classiﬁcation model. This is because records
with different class labels become indistinguishable from one
another, when they fall into the same anonymization group. For
example, assume that all records, whose value in Ethnicity is
Welsh, have a classiﬁcation label Yes, whereas all records with
English have a label No. Generalizing the values Welsh and English
to British does not allow to distinguish between records that have
different classiﬁcation labels. To capture data utility, Iyengar intro-
duced the Classiﬁcation Metric (CM), which is expressed as the
number of records whose class labels are different from that of
the majority of records in their anonymized group, normalized
by the dataset size.
LeFevre et al. [66] considered measuring the utility of anony-
mized data when used for aggregate query answering purposes
and proposed a measure, called Average Relative Error (ARE). ARE
quantiﬁes data utility by measuring the difference between the
answers to a query using the anonymized and using the original
data. This measure has been widely employed, as it is applicable
to different types of data (e.g., both demographics and diagnosis
codes) and is independent of the way data are anonymized. Fung
et al. [41], on the other hand, considered clustering and proposed
comparing the cluster structures of the original and anonymized
data, using the F-measure [122] and Match point. Although these
measures are also general, currently they have only been applied
to demographics.
Several publishing scenarios involve the release of an anony-
mized dataset to support a speciﬁc medical study, or to data recip-
ients having certain data analysis requirements. In such scenarios,
knowledge of how the dataset will be analyzed can be exploited
during anonymization to better preserve data utility. For example,
consider a dataset which contains Age, Gender, Ethnicity, and
Marital Status, as quasi-identiﬁers, and needs to be released
for performing a study on the age of female patients. Intuitively,
distorting the values of the ﬁrst two attributes should be avoided,
as the result of the study depends on their values. Samarati pro-
posed modeling data analysis requirements based on the mini-
mum number of suppressed tuples, or on the height of
hierarchies for categorical QID values [109]. However, such
requirements are difﬁcult to be speciﬁed by data publishers, as
they require knowledge of how the dataset will be anonymized.
Xu et al. [129] prioritized the anonymization of certain quasi-
identiﬁer attributes by using data-owner speciﬁed weights. The
proposed approach, however, cannot guarantee that some attri-
butes will not be overdistorted (e.g., gender information can be
lost, even when the generalization of Ethnicity is preferred to
that of Gender). To guarantee that the anonymized data willremain useful for the speciﬁed analysis requirements, Loukides
et al. [85] proposed a model for expressing data utility require-
ments and an algorithm for anonymizing data, based on this
model. Utility requirements can be expressed at an attribute level
(e.g., imposing the length of range, or the size of set that anony-
mized groups may have in a given quasi-identiﬁer attribute), or
at a value level (e.g., imposing ranges or sets allowed for speciﬁed
values). The approach of [85] can be applied to patient demograph-
ics but not to diagnosis codes.
Anonymizing diagnosis codes in a way that satisﬁes data utility
requirements has been considered in [76]. The proposed approach
models data utility requirements using sets of diagnosis codes,
referred to as utility constraints. A utility constraint represents
the ways the codes, contained in it, can be generalized in order
to preserve data utility. Thus, utility constraints specify the infor-
mation that the anonymized data should retain in order to be use-
ful in intended medical analysis tasks. For example, assume that
the disseminated data must support a study that requires counting
the number of patients with Diabetes. To achieve this, a utility
constraint for Diabetes, which is comprised of all different types
of diabetes, must be speciﬁed. By anonymizing data according to
this utility constraint, we can ensure that the number of patients
with Diabetes in the anonymized data will be the same as in the
original data. Thus, the anonymized dataset will be as useful as
the original one, for the medical study on diabetes.
4.1.3. Heuristic strategies
Optimally anonymizing data with respect to the aforemen-
tioned utility criteria is computationally infeasible (see for exam-
ple [66,129,78]). Consequently, many anonymization methods
employ heuristic search strategies to form anonymous groups. In
what follows, we discuss search strategies that have been applied
to demographics and diagnosis codes.
4.1.3.1. Algorithms for demographics. Algorithms for demographics
typically employ: (i) binary search on the lattice of possible gener-
alizations [109], (ii) a lattice search strategy similar in principle to
the Apriori [7] used in association rule mining, (iii) genetic search
on the lattice of possible generalizations [58], (iv) data partitioning
[66,57], (v) data clustering [102,129,81,68], or (vi) space mapping
[44].
The main idea behind strategies (i)–(iii) is to represent the pos-
sible ways to generalize a value in a quasi-identiﬁer attribute,
using a taxonomy, and then combine the taxonomies for all
quasi-identiﬁer attributes, to obtain a lattice. For instance, English
and Welsh are the leaf-level nodes of a taxonomy for Ethnicity
and their immediate ascendant is the generalized value British.
Similarly, Male and Female are the leaf-level nodes of a taxonomy
for Gender, whose root value and immediate ascendant of the
leaves is Any. Thus, we can combine these two taxonomies to get
a lattice for Ethnicity and Gender. Each node in this lattice rep-
resents a different set of generalized values for Ethnicity and
Gender, such as {English, Male}, {English, Female}, {Welsh, Male},
and {British, Any}. Thus, ﬁnding a way to generalize values can be
performed by exploring the lattice using heuristics that avoid con-
sidering certain lattice nodes for efﬁciency reasons. The strategy (i)
prunes the ascendants of lattice nodes that are sufﬁcient to satisfy
a privacy model, while the strategies (ii) and (iii) prune lattice
nodes that are likely to incur high utility loss. The latter nodes
are identiﬁed while considering nodes that represent incremen-
tally larger sets of generalized values, for strategy (i), or while
selecting nodes by combining their descendants, as speciﬁed by a
genetic algorithm, in the case of strategy (ii).
Binary and Apriori-like lattice search strategies explore a small
space of potential solutions and thus may fail to preserve data
utility to the extent that genetic search strategies can do. However,
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[58] is orders of magnitude slower than the partitioning-based
method of [66]) and may converge slowly. Consequently, more
recent research has focused on developing methods that use strat-
egies (iv) and (v), which are applied to the records of a dataset, and
not to attribute values as strategies (i)–(iii) are. The objective of the
former strategies is to organize records into carefully selected
groups that help the preservation of privacy and the satisfaction
of a utility objective. Both data partitioning and clustering-based
strategies create groups iteratively, but they differ in the task they
perform in an iteration. Speciﬁcally, partition-based strategies split
records into groups, based on the value that these records have in a
single quasi-identiﬁer attribute (i.e., an iteration creates two typi-
cally large groups of records that are similar with respect to a
quasi-identiﬁer), while clustering-based strategies merge two
groups of records, based on the values of the records in all quasi-
identiﬁer attributes together. Therefore, partitioning-based
methods tend to incur higher utility loss when compared to clus-
tering-based methods [129,81], and they are sensitive to the choice
of the splitting attribute, performing poorly particularly when the
dataset is skewed [102]. However, partitioning is faster than clus-
tering by orders of magnitude, requiring Oðn  logðnÞÞ time instead
of Oðn2Þ, where n is the cardinality of the dataset.
A different heuristic search strategy relies on space mapping
techniques [44]. These techniques create a ranking of records, such
that records with similar values in quasi-identiﬁers have similar
ranks. Based on this ranking, groups of records are subsequently
formed by considering a number of records (e.g., at least k for
k-anonymity) that have consecutive ranks. Space mapping tech-
niques achieve good efﬁciency, as the ranking can be calculated
in linear time, as well as being effective at preserving data utility.4.1.3.2. Algorithms for diagnosis codes. Algorithms for diagnosis
codes employ: (i) space partitioning in a bottom-up [76] or top-
down [16] fashion, (ii) space clustering [46], or (iii) data partitioning
in a top-down [52], vertical or horizontal [116] way. Clearly, lattice
search cannot be used in the context of diagnosis codes, because
there is a single, set-valued attribute to consider. Thus, one taxon-
omy which organizes diagnosis codes, and not a lattice of taxono-
mies, is used to model the ways these codes can be generalized. In
addition, the space mapping techniques considered by Ghinita
et al. in [44] are not applicable to diagnosis codes because there is
a single, set-valued quasi-identiﬁer attribute (i.e., a patient can be
re-identiﬁed using a set of their diagnosis codes) and not many
quasi-identiﬁer attributes, as in the case of patient demographics.Table 4
Algorithms for preventing identity disclosure based on demographics.
Algorithm Privacy model Transformation
k-Minimal generalization [109] k-Anonymity Generalization and
OLA [32] k-Anonymity Generalization
Incognito [65] k-Anonymity Generalization and
Genetic [58] k-Anonymity Generalization
Mondrian [66] k-Anonymity Generalization
LSD Mondrian [67] k-Anonymity Generalization
Infogain Mondrian [67] k-Anonymity Generalization
TDS [40] k-Anonymity Generalization
NNG [28] k-Anonymity Generalization
Greedy [129] k-Anonymity Generalization
k-Member [15] k-Anonymity Generalization
KACA [68] k-Anonymity Generalization
Agglomerative [45] k-Anonymity Generalization
(k,k)-Anonymizer [45] (k,k)-Anonymity Generalization
Hilb [44] k-Anonymity Generalization
iDist [44] k-Anonymity Generalization
MDAV [25] k-Anonymity Microaggregation
CBFS [62] k-Anonymity MicroaggregationBoth strategies (i) and (ii) attempt to ﬁnd a set of generalized
diagnosis codes that can be used to replace diagnosis codes in
the original dataset (e.g., ‘‘diabetes’’ that replaces ‘‘diabetes melli-
tus type I’’ and ‘‘diabetes mellitus type II’’). However, they differ
in the way they operate. Speciﬁcally, space partitioning strategies
require a taxonomy for diagnosis codes, which is provided by data
owners (e.g., a healthcare institution), and dictate that the general-
ized diagnosis codes are part of the taxonomy. Space clustering
strategies lift this requirement and are more effective in terms of
preserving data utility. On the other hand, data partitioning strat-
egies are applied to transactions (records) instead of diagnosis
codes, and they aim to create groups of transactions that can be
subsequently anonymized with low data utility loss. For example,
assume that privacy is preserved by applying km-anonymity with
k ¼ 2 andm ¼ 2. Two transactions with exactly the same diagnosis
codes are already 22-anonymous, and thus they do not incur data
utility loss as they can be released intact.
Space partitioning allows searching only a smaller space of pos-
sible solutions and typically results in incurring high information
loss when compared to space clustering strategies. On the other
hand, space clustering-based strategies are computationally inten-
sive. It is important to note that the worst-case complexity of all
strategies is exponential to the number of distinct diagnosis codes
in a dataset, which can be in the order of several hundreds. This
explains the need for developing more effective and efﬁcient
strategies.
4.1.4. Classiﬁcation of algorithms
We now present a classiﬁcation of algorithms for preventing
identity disclosure, based on the strategies they adopt for (i) trans-
forming quasi-identiﬁers, (ii) preserving utility, and (iii) heuristi-
cally searching for a ‘‘good’’ solution.
4.1.4.1. Algorithms for demographics. Table 4 presents a classiﬁca-
tion of algorithms for demographics. As can be seen, these algo-
rithms employ various data transformation and heuristic
strategies, and aim at satisfying different utility objectives. All
algorithms adopt k-anonymity, with the exception of ðk; kÞ-anony-
mizer [45] which adopts the ðk; kÞ-anonymity model, discussed in
Section 2.2. The fact that ðk; kÞ-anonymity is a relaxation of
k-anonymity allows the algorithm in [45] to preserve more data
utility than the Agglomerative algorithm, which is also proposed
in [45]. Furthermore, most algorithms use generalization to
anonymize data, except (i) the algorithms in [109,65], which use
suppression in addition to generalization in order to deal with aUtility objective Heuristic strategy
suppression Min. inf. loss Binary lattice search
Min. inf. loss Binary lattice search
suppression Min. inf. loss Apriori-like lattice search
Classiﬁcation accuracy Genetic search
Min. inf. loss Data partitioning
Regression accuracy Data partitioning
Classiﬁcation accuracy Data partitioning
Classiﬁcation accuracy Data partitioning
Min. inf. loss Data Partitioning
Min. inf. loss Data clustering
Min. inf. loss Data clustering
Min. inf. loss Data clustering
Min. inf. loss Data clustering
Min. inf. loss Data clustering
Min. inf. loss Space mapping
Min. inf. loss Space mapping
Min. inf. loss Data clustering
Min. inf. loss Data clustering
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mation loss if generalized and (ii) the algorithms in [25,62], which
use microaggregation.
In addition, it can be observed that the majority of algorithms
aim at minimizing information loss and that no algorithm takes
into account speciﬁc utility requirements, such as limiting the set
of allowable ways for generalizing a value in a quasi-identiﬁer.
At the same time, the Genetic [58], Infogain Mondrian [67], and
TDS [40] algorithms aim at releasing data in a way that allows
for building accurate classiﬁers. These algorithms were compared
in terms of how well they can support classiﬁcation tasks, using
publicly available demographic datasets [53,119]. The results are
reported in [67,40], and demonstrate that Infogain Mondrian out-
performs TDS which, in turn, outperforms the Genetic algorithm.
The LSD Mondrian [67] algorithm is similar to Infogain Mondrian
but uses a different utility objective measure, as its goal is to pre-
serve the ability of using the released data for linear regression.
It is also interesting to observe that several algorithms imple-
ment data partitioning heuristic strategies. Speciﬁcally, the algo-
rithms proposed in [66,67] follow a top-down partitioning
strategy inspired by kd-trees [38], while the TDS algorithm [40]
employs a different strategy that takes into account the partition
size and data utility in terms of classiﬁcation accuracy. Interest-
ingly, the partitioning strategy of NNG [28] is based on the distance
of values and allows creating k-anonymous datasets, whose utility
is no more than 6  q times worse than that of the optimal solution,
where q is the number of quasi-identiﬁers in the dataset. On the
other hand, the algorithms that employ clustering [129,15,98,45]
follow a similar greedy, bottom-up procedure, which aims at build-
ing clusters of at least k records by iteratively merging together
smaller clusters (of one or more records), in a way that helps data
utility preservation. A detailed discussion and evaluation of clus-
tering-based algorithms that employ generalization has been
reported in [82], while the authors of [25,26] provide a rigorous
analysis of clustering-based algorithms for microaggregation.
The use of space mapping techniques in algorithms iHilb and
iDist, both of which were proposed in [44], enables them to pre-
serve data utility equally well or even better than the Mondrian
algorithm [66] and to anonymize data more efﬁciently. To map
the space of quasi-identiﬁers, iHilb uses the Hilbert curve, which
can preserve the locality of points (i.e., values in quasi-identiﬁers)
fairly well [97]. The intuition behind using this curve is that, with
high probability, two records with similar values in quasi-
identiﬁers will also be similar with respect to their rank that is pro-
duced based on the curve. The iDist algorithm employs iDistance
[131], a technique that measures similarity based on sampling
and clustering of points, and is shown to be slightly inferior than
iHilb in terms of data utility. Last, the algorithms in [109,65,32]
use lattice-search strategies. An experimental evaluation using a
publicly available dataset containing demographics [53], as well
as 5 hospital discharge summaries, shows that the OLA algorithmTable 5
Algorithms for preventing identity disclosure based on diagnosis codes.
Algorithm Privacy model Transformation
UGACLIP [76] Privacy-constrained anonymity Generalization a
CBA [87] Privacy-constrained anonymity Generalization a
UAR [86] Privacy-constrained anonymity Generalization a
Apriori [115] km-Anonymity Generalization
LRA [116] km-Anonymity Generalization
km-Anonymity
VPA [116] km-Anonymity Generalization
km-Anonymity
mHgHs [74] km-Anonymity Generalization a
Recursive partition [52] Complete k-anonymity Generalization[32] performs similarly to Incognito [65] and better than k-
Minimal Generalization [109] in terms of preserving data utility.
The authors of [32] also suggest that the way OLA generalizes data
might help medical data analysts. Nevertheless, algorithms that
use lattice-based search strategies typically explore a smaller
number of generalizations than algorithms that employ data
partitioning or clustering, and are generally less effective at
preserving data utility.
4.1.4.2. Algorithms for diagnosis codes. Algorithms for anonymizing
diagnosis codes are summarized in Table 5. Observe that these
algorithms adopt different privacy models, but they all use either
a combination of generalization and suppression, or generalization
alone in order to anonymize datasets. More speciﬁcally, the algo-
rithms in [76,87,86] use suppression as a secondary operation
and only when generalization alone cannot be used to satisfy the
speciﬁed utility constraints. However, they differ in that CBA and
UAR consider suppressing individual diagnosis codes, whereas
UGACLIP suppresses sets of typically more than one diagnosis
codes. Experiments using patient records derived from the
Electronic Medical Record (EMR) system of Vanderbilt University
Medical Center, which are reported in [87,86], showed that the
suppression strategy that is employed by CBA and UAR is more
effective than that of UGACLIP.
Furthermore, the algorithms in Table 5 aim at either satisfying
utility requirements, or at minimizing information loss. The
UGACLIP, CBA, and UAR algorithms adopt utility constraints to for-
mulate utility requirements and attempt to satisfy them. However,
these algorithms still favor solutions with low information loss,
among those that satisfy the speciﬁed utility constraints. All other
algorithms attempt to minimize information loss, which they
quantify using two different measures; a variation of the Normal-
ized Certainty Penalty (NCP) measure [129] for the algorithms in
[115,116,52], or the Loss Metric (LM) [58] for the mHgHs algorithm
[74]. However, to our knowledge, there are no algorithms for diag-
nosis codes that aim at preserving data utility for intended mining
tasks, such as classiﬁcation. Given the extensive use of diagnosis
codes in these tasks, we believe that the development of such
algorithms merits further investigation.
It is also interesting to observe that several algorithms imple-
ment data partitioning heuristic strategies. Speciﬁcally, the algo-
rithms proposed in [66,67] follow a top-down partitioning
strategy inspired by kd-trees [38], while the TDS algorithm [40]
employs a different strategy that takes into account the partition
size and data utility in terms of classiﬁcation accuracy. Interest-
ingly, the partitioning strategy of NNG [28] is based on the distance
of values and allows creating a k-anonymous dataset, whose utility
is no more than 6  q times worse than that of the optimal solution,
where q is the number of quasi-identiﬁers in the dataset. On the
other hand, the algorithms that employ clustering [129,15,98,45]
follow a similar greedy, bottom-up procedure, which aims atUtility objective Heuristic strategy
nd suppression Utility requirements Bottom-up space partitioning
nd suppression Utility requirements Space clustering
nd suppression Utility requirements Space clustering
Min. inf. loss Top-down space partitioning
Min. inf. loss Horizontal data
partitioning
Min. inf. loss Vertical data
partitioning
nd suppression Min. inf. loss Top-down space partitioning
Min. inf. loss Data partitioning
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together smaller clusters of records, in a way that helps data utility
preservation. A detailed discussion and evaluation of clustering-
based algorithms that employ generalization has been reported
in [82].
Moreover, it can be seen that all algorithms in Table 5 operate
on either the space of diagnosis codes, or on that of the records
of the dataset to be published. Speciﬁcally, UGACLIP [76] partitions
the space of diagnosis codes in a bottom-up manner, whereas
Apriori [115] and mHgHs [74] employ top-down partitioning
strategies. The strategy of UGACLIP considers a signiﬁcantly larger
number of ways to generalize diagnosis codes than that of Apriori,
which allows for better data utility preservation. In addition, the
space clustering strategies of CBA and UAR are far more effective
than the bottom-up space partitioning strategy of UGACLIP, but
they are also more computationally demanding.
Data partitioning strategies are employed by the Recursive par-
tition [52], LRA [116] and VPA [116] algorithms. The ﬁrst of these
algorithms employs a top-down partitioning strategy, which is
applied recursively. That is, it starts by a dataset which contains
(i) all transactions of the dataset to be published and (ii) a single
generalized diagnosis code Any, which replaces all diagnosis codes.
This dataset is split into subpartitions of at least k transactions,
which contain progressively less general diagnosis codes (e.g.,
Any is replaced by Diabetes and then by Diabetes mellitus type I).
The strategy employed by the Recursive partition algorithm
enforces complete k-anonymity with lower utility loss than that
of Apriori [52]. On the other hand, LRA and VPA use horizontal
and vertical data partitioning strategies, respectively. Speciﬁcally,
LRA attempts to create subpartitions of transactions with ‘‘similar’’
items that can be generalized with low information loss. To achieve
this, it sorts the transactions in the dataset to be published based
on Gray ordering [106] and then groups these transactions into
subpartitions of approximately equal size. VPA partitions data
records vertically in order to create sub-records (i.e., parts of trans-
actions) with ‘‘similar’’ items. The Apriori algorithm, discussed
above, is then used by the LRA and VPA algorithms for anonymiz-
ing each of the created subpartitions, separately.
4.2. Techniques against membership disclosure
The fact that membership disclosure cannot be forestalled by
simply preventing identity disclosure, calls for specialized algo-
rithms. However, as can be seen in Table 6, the proposed algo-
rithms for membership disclosure share the same main
components (i.e., quasi-identiﬁer transformation strategy, utility
objective, and heuristic strategy) with the algorithms that protect
from identity disclosure. Furthermore, these algorithms are all
applied to demographics.
All existing algorithms against membership disclosure have
been proposed by Nergiz et al. [100,101], to the best of our knowl-
edge. In [100], they proposed two algorithms, called SPALM and
MPALM, which transform quasi-identiﬁers, using generalization,
and aim at ﬁnding a solution that satisﬁes d-presence with low
information loss. Both algorithms adopt a top-down search on
the lattice of all possible generalizations, but they differ in their
generalization model. Speciﬁcally, the SPALM algorithm general-
izes the values of each quasi-identiﬁer separately, requiring all val-
ues in a quasi-identiﬁer to be generalized in the same way (e.g., all
values English, in Ethnicity, are generalized to British). On the con-
trary, the MPALM algorithm drops this requirement, allowing
two records with the same value in a quasi-identiﬁer to be general-
ized differently (e.g., one value English to be generalized to British
and another to European). In a subsequent work [101], Nergiz
et al. proposed an algorithm called SFALM, which is similar to
SPALM but employs c-conﬁdent d-presence. The fact that the latterprivacy model does not require complete information about the
population, as discussed above, greatly improves the applicability
of SFALM in practice.
The aforementioned algorithms against membership disclosure
are limited in their choice of data transformation strategies and
utility objectives, since they all employ generalization and aim at
minimizing information loss. We believe that developing algo-
rithms that adopt different data transformation strategies (e.g.,
microaggregation) and utility objectives (e.g., utility requirements)
is worthwhile. At the same time, the algorithms in [100,101] are
not applicable to diagnosis codes, because diagnosis codes have
different semantics than demographics. However, it is easy to see
that membership disclosure attacks based on diagnosis codes are
possible, because diagnosis codes can be used to reveal the fact
that a patient’s record is contained in the published dataset. This
calls for developing algorithms for sharing diagnosis codes in a
way that forestalls membership disclosure.
4.2.1. Techniques against attribute disclosure
In what follows, we discuss privacy considerations that are
speciﬁc for algorithms that aim at thwarting attribute disclosure.
Subsequently, we present a classiﬁcation of these algorithms.
Algorithms for preventing attribute disclosure enforce privacy
principles that govern the associations between quasi-identiﬁer
and sensitive values (e.g., Income in a demographics dataset or
Schizophrenia in a dataset containing diagnosis codes). To enforce
these principles, they create anonymous groups and then merge
them iteratively, until the associations between these attributes
and sensitive values become protected, according to a certain pri-
vacy model (e.g., l-diversity) [88,118,126,69,67]. While this can be
achieved using generalization and/ or suppression, a technique
called bucketization has been proposed in [127] as a viable alterna-
tive. Bucketization works by releasing: (i) a projection Dq of the
dataset D on the set of quasi-identiﬁers, and another projection,
Ds, on the sensitive attribute and (ii) a group membership attribute
that speciﬁes the associations between records in Dq and Ds. By
carefully constructing Dq and Ds, it is possible to enforce l-diversity
with low information loss [127], as values in quasi-identiﬁers are
released intact. However, the algorithm in [127] does not guaran-
tee that identity disclosure will be prevented.
Many of the algorithms considered in this section follow the
same data transformation strategies and utility objectives, with
the algorithms examined in Section 4, but they additionally ensure
that sensitive values are protected within each anonymized group.
This approach helps data publishers construct data that are no
more distorted than necessary to thwart attribute disclosure, and
the algorithms following this approach are termed protection
constrained. Alternatively, data publishers may want to produce
data with a desired trade-off between data utility and privacy
protection against identity disclosure. This is possible using
trade-off constrained algorithms [81,83,84]. These algorithms quan-
tify and aim at optimizing the trade-off between the distortion
caused by generalization and the level of data protection against
attribute disclosure.
4.2.1.1. Algorithms for demographics. A classiﬁcation of algorithms
for demographics is presented in Table 7. As can be seen, the
majority of these algorithms follow the protection-constrained
approach and are based on algorithms for identity disclosure, such
as Incognito [65], Mondrian [66], iHilb [44], or iDist [44]. Further-
more, most of these algorithms employ generalization, or a combi-
nation of generalization and suppression, and they enforce
l-diversity, t-closeness, p-sensitive k-anonymity, ða; kÞ-anonymity,
or tuple-diversity. An exception is the Anatomize algorithm
[127], which was speciﬁcally developed for enforcing l-diversity
using bucketization. This algorithmworks by creating buckets with
Table 6
Algorithms for preventing membership disclosure.
Algorithm Data type Privacy model Transformation Utility objective Heuristic strategy
SPALM [100] Demographics d-Presence Generalization Min. inf. loss Top-down lattice search
MPALM [100] Demographics d-Presence Generalization Min. inf. loss Top-down lattice search
SFALM [101] Demographics c-Conﬁdent Generalization Min. inf. loss Top-down lattice search
d-Presence
Table 7
Algorithms for preventing attribute disclosure based on demographics.
Algorithm Privacy model Transformation Approach Heuristic strategy
Incognito with l-Diversity Generalization Protection constrained Apriori-like lattice
l-diversity [88] and suppression search
Incognito with t-Closeness Generalization Protection constrained Apriori-like lattice
t-closeness [69] and suppression search
Incognito with ða; kÞ-Anonymity Generalization Protection constrained Apriori-like lattice
ða; kÞ-anonymity [126] and suppression search
p-Sens k-anon [118] p-Sensitive Generalization Protection constrained Apriori-like lattice
k-anonymity search
Mondrian with l-diversity [127] l-Diversity Generalization Protection constrained Data partitioning
Mondrian with t-closeness [70] t-Closeness Generalization Protection constrained Data partitioning
Top down [126] ða; kÞ-Anonymity Generalization Protection constrained Data partitioning
Greedy algorithm [81] Tuple diversity Generalization and suppression Trade-off constrained Data clustering
Hilb with l-diversity [44] l-Diversity Generalization Protection constrained Space mapping
iDist with l-diversity [44] l-Diversity Generalization Protection constrained Space mapping
Anatomize [127] l-Diversity Bucketization Protection constrained Quasi-identiﬁers are released intact
Table 8
Algorithms for preventing attribute disclosure based on diagnosis codes.
Algorithm Privacy model Transformation Approach Heuristic strategy
Greedy [130] ðh; k;pÞ-Coherence Suppression Protection constrained Greedy search
SuppressControl [16] q-Uncertainty Suppression Protection constrained Greedy search
TDControl [16] q-Uncertainty Generalization and suppression Protection constrained Top-down space partitioning
RBAT [79] PS-rule based anonymity Generalization Protection constrained Top-down space partitioning
Tree-based [80] PS-rule based anonymity Generalization Protection constrained Top-down space partitioning
Sample-based [80] PS-rule based anonymity Generalization Protection constrained Top-down and bottom-up space partitioning
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then constructing groups with at least l different values in the sen-
sitive attribute. The construction of groups is performed by select-
ing records from appropriate buckets, in a round-robin fashion.
Interestingly, the Anatomize algorithm requires an amount of
memory that is linear to the number of distinct values of the
sensitive attribute and creates anonymized data with bounded
reconstruction error, which quantiﬁes how well correlations among
values in quasi-identiﬁers and the sensitive attribute are pre-
served. In fact, the authors of [127] demonstrated experimentally
that the Anatomize algorithm outperforms an adaption of the
Mondrian algorithm that enforces l-diversity in terms of preserving
data utility. Moreover, it is worth noting that the algorithms in
[118,126,81], which employ p-sensitive k-anonymity, ða; kÞ-
anonymity, or tuple diversity, are applied to both quasi-identiﬁers
and sensitive attributes and provide protection from identity and
attribute disclosure together. On the other hand, the Anatomize
algorithm does not provide protection guarantees against identity
disclosure, as all values in quasi-identiﬁers are released intact.
4.2.1.2. Algorithms for diagnosis codes. Algorithms for anonymizing
diagnosis codes against attribute disclosure are summarized in
Table 8. As can be seen, the algorithms adopt different privacy
models, namely ðh; k; pÞ-coherence, q-uncertainty, or PS-rule based
anonymity, and they use suppression, generalization, or a combi-
nation of suppression and generalization. Speciﬁcally, the authors
in [16] propose an algorithm, called TDControl, which applies sup-
pression when generalization alone cannot enforce q-uncertainty,and a second algorithm, called SuppressControl, which only
employs suppression. Through experiments, they demonstrate that
combining suppression with generalization is beneﬁcial for both
data utility preservation and efﬁciency.
Another algorithm that uses suppression only is the Greedy
algorithm, which was proposed by Xu et al. [130] to enforce
ðh; k; pÞ-coherence. This algorithm discovers all unprotected com-
binations of diagnosis codes with minimal size and protects each
identiﬁed combination, by iteratively suppressing the diagnosis
code contained in the greatest number of these combinations. On
the other hand, the RBAT [79], Tree-based [80], and Sample-based
[80] algorithms employ generalization alone. All algorithms follow
the protection-constrained approach, as they minimize informa-
tion loss no more than necessary to prevent attribute disclosure.
In terms of heuristic search strategies, the algorithms in Table 8
employ a greedy search and operate on either the space of diagno-
sis codes, or on the transactions of the dataset to be published. Spe-
ciﬁcally, UGACLIP [76] partitions the space of diagnosis codes in a
bottom-upmanner, whereas Apriori [115] and mHgHs [74] employ
top-down partitioning strategies. The strategy of UGACLIP consid-
ers a signiﬁcantly larger number of ways to generalize diagnosis
codes than that of Apriori, which allows better data utility preser-
vation. In addition, the space clustering strategies of CBA and UAR
are more effective than the bottom-up space partitioning strategy
of UGACLIP, but they are more computationally demanding.
Moreover, all algorithms in Table 8 operate on the space of diag-
nosis codes and either perform greedy search to discover diagnosis
codes that can be suppressed with low data utility loss, or they
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and the Tree-based algorithm all employ top-down partitioning,
while Sample-based uses both top-down and bottom-up partition-
ing strategies. The main difference between the strategy of TDCon-
trol and that of RBAT is that the former is based on a taxonomy,
which is used to organize diagnosis codes. This restricts the possi-
ble ways of partitioning diagnosis codes to those that can be
expressed as cuts in the taxonomy,2 whereas the strategy of RBAT
partitions the space in a more ﬂexible way as it does not employ this
restriction. This helps the preservation of data utility, as it allows
exploring more ways to generalize data. The process of partitioning
employed by RBAT can be thought of as ‘‘growing’’ a tree, where the
nodes correspond to increasingly less generalized diagnosis codes.
However, it was shown in [80] that the strategy employed in RBAT
might fail to preserve data utility well, as the ‘‘growing’’ of the tree
may stop ‘‘early’’. That is, a replacement of diagnosis codes with less
general ones, which is beneﬁcial for data utility, is possible but has
not been considered by the strategy employed by RBAT.
To address this issue, a different strategy that examines such
replacements, when partitioning the space of diagnosis codes,
was proposed in [80]. This strategy examines certain branches of
the tree that are not examined by the strategy of RBAT and its
use allows the Tree-based algorithm to preserve data utility better
than RBAT. Moreover, to further increase the number of ways to
generalize data, the authors of [80] proposed a way to combine
top-down with bottom-up partitioning strategies, by ﬁrst growing
the tree as long as identity disclosure is prevented, and then back-
tracking (i.e., traversing the tree in a bottom-up way) to ensure
that attribute disclosure is guarded against.5. Relevant techniques
This section provides a discussion of privacy-preserving tech-
niques that are relevant, but not directly related, to those surveyed
in this paper. These techniques are applied to different types of
medical data, or aim at privately releasing aggregate information
about the data.
5.1. Privacy-preserving sharing of genomic and text data
While many works investigate threats related to the publishing
of demographics and diagnosis codes, there have been consider-
able efforts by the computer science and health informatics com-
munities to preserve the privacy of other types of data, such as
genomic and text. In the following, we brieﬂy discuss techniques
that have been proposed for the protection of each of the latter
types of data.
5.1.1. Genomic privacy
It is worth noting that a patient’s record may be distinguishable
with respect to genomic data. Lin et al. [88], for example, estimated
that an individual is unique with respect to a small number
(approximately 100) of Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs),
i.e., DNA sequence variations occurring when a single nucleotide
in the genome differs between paired chromosomes in an individ-
ual. In addition, the release of aggregate genomic information may
threaten privacy, as genomic sequences contain sensitive informa-
tion, such as the ancestral origin of an individual [108], and genetic
information about the individual’s family members [17]). For
instance, Homer et al. [54] showed that such information may
allow an attacker to infer whether an individual belongs to the case2 A cut is a set of generalized diagnosis codes that correspond to nodes of the
taxonomy and replace (map) one or more diagnosis codes in the original dataset
Furthermore, the mapping must be such that each diagnosis code in the origina
dataset is mapped to exactly one of these generalized codes..
lor control group of GWAS data (i.e., if the individual is diagnosed
with a GWAS-related disease or not), while Wang et al. [123]
presented two attacks; one that can statistically determine the
presence of an individual in the case group, based upon a measure
of the correlation between alleles, and another that allows the
inference of the SNP sequences of many individuals that are
present in the GWAS data, based on correlations between SNPs.
To protect the privacy of genomic information, there are several
techniques that are based on cryptography (e.g., see [8] and the ref-
erences therein) or on perturbation (e.g., see [37]). For instance,
Wang et al. [124] proposed cryptographic techniques for the com-
putation of edit distance on genomic data, while Baldi et al. [8]
considered different operations, including paternity and genetic
compatibility tests. On the other hand, Fienberg et al. [37] exam-
ined how to release aggregate statistics for GWAS while satisfying
differential privacy through perturbation. In particular, the authors
of [37] proposed two methods; one that focuses on the publication
of the v2 statistic and p-values and works by adding Laplace noise
to the original statistics, and a second method that allows releasing
noisy versions of these statistics for the most relevant SNPs.
5.1.2. Text de-identiﬁcation
A considerable amount of information about patients is con-
tained in textual data, such as clinical notes, SOAP (Subjective,
Objective, Assessment, Patient care plan) notes, radiology and
pathology reports, and discharge summaries. Text data contain
much conﬁdential information about a patient, including their
name, medical record identiﬁer, and social security number, which
must be protected before data release. This involves two steps: (i)
detecting direct identiﬁers and (ii) transforming the detected iden-
tiﬁers, in a way that preserves the integrity of medical information.
The latter step is called de-identiﬁcation. In the following, we brieﬂy
discuss some techniques that have been proposed for both detect-
ing and transforming direct identiﬁers. We refer the reader to the
survey by Meystre et al. [94], for an extensive review.
Techniques for discovering direct identiﬁers are based on: (i)
Named Entity Recognition (NER), (ii) Grammars (or Rules), and (iii)
Statistical learning. NER-based techniques work by locating direct
identiﬁers in text and then classifying them into pre-deﬁned cate-
gories. For instance, the atomic elements Tom Green and
6152541261 in a clinical note would be classiﬁed into the category
for Name and Phone Number, respectively.
The second type of techniques use hand-coded rules and dictio-
naries to identify direct identiﬁers, or regular expressions for iden-
tiﬁers that follow certain syntactic patterns (e.g., a phone number
must start with a valid area code), while the last type of techniques
are typically based on classiﬁcation. That is, they aim at classifying
the terms of previously unseen elements, contained in test data, as
direct identiﬁers or as non-identiﬁers, based on knowledge of
training data.
The main advantage of NER and grammar-based approaches is
that they need little or no training data, and can be easily modiﬁed
(e.g., by adding a new regular expression). However, their conﬁgu-
ration typically requires signiﬁcant domain expertise (e.g., to spec-
ify rules) and, in many cases, knowledge of the speciﬁc dataset
(e.g., naming conventions). On the other hand, techniques that
are based on statistical learning can ‘‘learn’’ the characteristics of
data, using different methods, such as Support Vector Machines
(SVM) [14] or Conditional Random Fields (CRF) [61]. However, they
are limited in that they typically require large training datasets,
such as manually annotated text data with pre-labeled identiﬁers,
whose construction is challenging [13].
After the discovery of direct identiﬁers, there are several trans-
formation strategies that can be applied to them. These include the
replacement of direct identiﬁers with fake, but realistic-looking,
elements [111,12,50], suppression [18], and generalization [59].
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direct identiﬁers without offering speciﬁc privacy guarantees. On
the contrary, the works of Chakaravarthy et al. [18] and Jiang
et al. [59] offer such guarantees by employing privacy models.
The ﬁrst of these works proposes the K-safety model, which
prevents the matching of documents to entities, based on terms
that co-occur in a document. This is achieved by lower-bounding
the number of entities that these terms correspond to. The work
of Jiang et al. [59] proposes a different privacy model, called
t-plausibility, which, given word ontologies and a threshold t,
requires the sanitized text to be associated with at least t plausible
texts, any of which could be the original text.
5.1.3. Aggregate information release
There are certain applications in which data recipients are inter-
ested in learning aggregate information from the data, instead of
detailed information about individual records. Such aggregate
information can range from simple statistics that are directly com-
puted from the data to complex patterns that are discovered
through the application of data mining techniques. The interest
for supporting these applications has been fueled by recent
advances in the development of semantic privacy models. These
models dictate that the mechanism chosen for releasing the aggre-
gate information (e.g., in the form of a noisy summary of the data),
must satisfy certain properties.
One of the most established semantic models is differential
privacy [49], which requires the outcome of a calculation to be
insensitive to any particular record in the dataset. More formally,
given an arbitrary, randomized function K and a subset S of its
possible outputs, a dataset D is differentially private if
PðKðDÞ 2 SÞ 6 e  PðKðD0Þ 2 SÞ ð1Þ
where D0 is a dataset that differs from D in only one record, and
PðKðDÞ 2 SÞ (respectively, PðKðD0Þ 2 SÞ) is the probability that the
result of applying K to D (respectively, D0), is contained in the subset
S. For instance, the result of statistical analysis carried out on a dif-
ferentially private data summary must be insensitive to the inser-
tion (or deletion) of a record in (from) the original dataset from
which the summary is produced. This offers privacy, because the
inferences an attacker can make about an individual will be approx-
imately independent of whether any individual’s record is included
in the original dataset or not. On the negative side, the enforcement
of differential privacy only allows the release of noisy summary sta-
tistics,3 and it does not guarantee the prevention of all attacks. Cor-
mode, for example, showed that an attacker can infer the sensitive
value of an individual fairly accurately, by applying a classiﬁcation
algorithm on differentially private data [21].
Differential privacy has led to the development of several other
semantic models, which are surveyed in [23]. These models relax
the (strong) privacy requirements posed by differential privacy
by: (i) introducing an additive factor d to the right part of Eq. (1)
[31] or (ii) considering attackers with limited computational
resources (i.e., attackers with polynomial time computation
bounds) [95]. This offers the advantage of limiting noise addition
at the expense of weaker privacy guarantees than those offered
by differential privacy.
At the same time, there are algorithms for enforcing differential
privacy which are applicable to demographics or diagnosis codes.
For example, Mohammed et al. [96] proposed a method to release
a noisy summary of a dataset containing demographics that aims
at preserving classiﬁcation accuracy, while Chen et al. [20] showed
how to release noisy answers to certain count queries involving3 This is similar to knowing the queries posed to a technique for enforcing
differential private in the interactive setting and releasing the noisy answers to these
queries in the form of a summary.sets of diagnosis codes. Interestingly, both techniques apply parti-
tioning strategies similar in principle to those used by the TDS
algorithm [40] and the Recursive partition [52] algorithm, respec-
tively. In addition, systems that allow the differentially private
release of aggregate information from electronic health records
are emerging. For instance, SHARE [42] is a recently proposed sys-
tem for releasing multidimensional histograms and longitudinal
patterns.6. Future research directions
Disseminating person-speciﬁc data from electronic health
records offers the potential for allowing large-scale, low-cost
medical studies, in areas including epidemic detection and post-
marketing safety evaluation. At the same time, preserving patient
privacy is necessary and, in many cases, this can be achieved based
on the techniques presented in this survey. However, there are
several directions that warrant further research.
First, it is important to study privacy threats posed when releas-
ing patient data, from both a theoretical and practical perspective.
This requires the identiﬁcation and modeling of privacy attacks,
beyond those discussed in the paper, and an evaluation of their fea-
sibility on large cohorts of patient data. In fact, it is currently difﬁ-
cult to automatically detect threats for many types of medical data
(e.g., for data containing diagnosis codes, or for genomic data),
despite some interesting work [10,35], on demographics, towards
this direction. Furthermore, knowledge of: (i) dependencies
between quasi-identiﬁers and sensitive values (e.g., the fact that
male patients are less likely to be diagnosed with breast cancer
than female ones) [72,27], (ii) quasi-identiﬁer values of particular
individuals [114] and/or their family members [19], and (iii) the
operations of anonymization algorithms [125], may pose privacy
risks. However, none of these threats has been investigated in
the context of medical data, and it is not clear whether or not
the solutions proposed by the computer science community to
tackle them are suitable for use in healthcare settings.
Second, the mining of published data may reveal privacy-
intrusive inferences about individuals [47,48,51], which cannot
be eliminated by applying the privacy models discussed so far.
Intuitively, this is because mining reveals knowledge patterns that
apply to a large number of individuals, and these patterns are not
considered as sensitive by the aforementioned privacy models.
Consider, for example, that an insurance company applies classiﬁ-
cation to the data obtained from a healthcare institution to
discover that patients over 40 years old, who live in an area with
Zip Code 55413, are likely to be diagnosed with diseases that have
a very high hospitalization cost. Based on this (sensitive) knowl-
edge, the insurance company may decide to offer more expensive
insurance coverage to these patients. To avoid such inferences,
sensitive knowledge patterns need to be identiﬁed prior to data
publishing and be concealed, so that they cannot be discovered
when the data are shared.
Third, the large growth in the complexity and size of medical
datasets that are being disseminated poses signiﬁcant challenges
to existing privacy-preserving algorithms. As an example of a com-
plex data type, consider a set of records that contain both demo-
graphics and diagnosis codes. Despite the need for analyzing
demographics and diagnosis codes together, in the context of med-
ical tasks (e.g., for predictive modeling), preserving the privacy of
such datasets is very challenging. This is because, it is not safe to
protect demographics and diagnosis codes independently, using
existing techniques (e.g., the Mondrian [66] algorithm for demo-
graphics and the UGACLIP [76] algorithm for diagnosis codes),
while guarding against this threat and minimizing information loss
is computationally infeasible [105]. In addition, the vast majority
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relatively small, so that it ﬁts into the main memory. However,
datasets with sizes of several GBs or even TBs may need to be dis-
seminated in practice. Thus, it would be worthwhile to develop
scalable techniques that potentially take advantage of parallel
architectures to solve this problem.
Fourth, privacy approaches that apply to complex data sharing
scenarios need to be proposed. As an example, consider the case
of multiple healthcare providers and data recipients who wish to
build a common data repository. Healthcare providers may, for
example, contribute different parts of patients’ EHR data to the
repository, whereas data recipients may be querying these data,
to obtain anonymized views (i.e., anonymized parts of one or more
datasets in the repository), for different purposes [77]. This sce-
nario presents several interesting challenges. First, data contrib-
uted by different providers need to be integrated in an efﬁcient
and privacy-preserving way. Second, user queries posed to the
repository need to be audited and the anonymized views to be pro-
duced, so as to adhere to the imposed privacy requirements.
Achieving privacy in this scenario is non-trivial, because malicious
users may combine their obtained views to breach privacy, even
when each query answer is safe when examined independently
of others.
Last but not least, it is important to note that the overall assur-
ance of health data privacy requires appropriate policy, in addition
to technical means that are exceedingly important.7. Conclusions
In this work, we presented a survey of privacy algorithms that
have been proposed for publishing structured patient data. We
reviewed more than 45 privacy algorithms, derived insights on
their operation, and highlighted their advantages and disadvan-
tages. Subsequently, we provided a discussion of some promising
directions for future research in this area.
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